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Abstract 
Intermodal service coordination designed to achieve a „seamless network‟ is a common feature 
of high-quality public transport systems. This paper explores the intention and the reality of the 
institutional arrangements that govern the coordination of bus, tram and train services in 
Melbourne under the franchise agreements.  
State Government policies and contractual obligations set out the intended lines of 
responsibility for the planning of transport networks in relation to design and delivery of 
coordinated multimodal services. Interviews, designed to examine the practical application of 
these policies and obligations, were conducted during 2009 with staff from the Department of 
Transport, the private operators, the Bus Association and from Metlink – the company 
established to improve communication and coordination of public transport services.  
The results of this investigation highlight the significant differences between actual practices 
and the stated intentions of both government policies and existing contracts with private sector 
organisations.  
The lack of effective designation of responsibilities, ineffective communication at many levels 
across numerous institutions, and an absence of skilled staff will continue to impede the 
development of a cohesive transport network in Melbourne. These problems were not 
addressed in the design of the new franchise agreements that began in December 2009. 
 
Biography of presenting author 
Kathren Lazanas completed her Masters of Urban Planning at the University of Melbourne in 
2009. She worked with JCDecaux as City Relations Manager for seven years, managing the 
roll-out of advertising infrastructure for the tram and train franchise operators.  
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1.  Introduction  
Privatisation of Melbourne‟s tram and train services, introduced in 1999, has undergone several 
changes to the structure and content of the franchise agreements between the state 
government and private operators, most notably in 2004 when single operators were appointed 
to run each mode and in 2009 when the franchises were re-tendered. At each iteration, 
promises were made regarding expected improvements to efficiency and coordination of 
services across the different modes of transport. 
This paper reports on research that contrasts the Victorian government‟s official policies and 
procedures for achieving intermodal connectivity in the operation of the public transport system 
in metropolitan Melbourne with the actual practice. This practice was revealed through 
interviews with key individuals from the Department of Transport‟s Public Transport Division, the 
tram and train franchisees (Transdev/Transfield and Connex), the bus association and Metlink. 
These interviews were conducted between March and July 2009, before the signing of new 
franchise contracts, which saw new operators installed for both tram and train1.  
The paper starts with a very brief review of recent literature on the importance of connectivity in 
creating successful public transport systems. This literature is notable for the rare agreement it 
reveals between researchers as diverse as Paul Mees and David Hensher. 
The paper continues with a description of policies of the Victorian ALP government that have 
been published since its election in 1999. Many of these documents set out clear targets and 
objectives and include specific organisational responsibilities and timelines for achieving 
intermodal connectivity. However, there is clear evidence that outcomes are not as positive as 
many supporters of the franchise approach might have been hoped 
Three key institutional mechanisms for delivering these policy objectivities are identified and 
assessed: strategic development frameworks; Metlink; and the more recent „network 
development partnerships‟ that have been formalised in the new franchise agreements. 
2. The importance of intermodality and connectivity 
Public transport is increasingly called on to serve diverse objectives – ranging from providing 
mobility to the disadvantaged through to alleviating traffic congestion – while making efficient 
use of financial resources. The challenge for public transport seems daunting. It must cater for 
travellers with very different needs, ranging from peak-period access to the CBD to all-day 
access to local shops and community centres. It also needs to provide attractive service, 
frequencies and operating hours for multiple destinations, while maintaining high occupancy 
rates. Some observers have argued that these trade-offs present an insoluble problem (Roth 
and Wynne 1982), but there is evidence to counter this assertion.  
The essence of public transport, reflected in its name, is carrying people with different origins 
and destinations in the same vehicle. These travellers can then be transported with lower 
                                            
1
 Full details can be found in the Appendix. Interviewees were given a draft of this paper and asked if the 
quotes selected by the authors accurately represented their views. No interviewee took issue with the 
way quotes were used, although some offered further information to clarify the context or the tone. The 
final text reflects this. 
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economic and environmental cost than if they travelled separately. This is public transport‟s 
strength, but also a weakness, as trips do not all have the same origins or destinations. 
One approach to diverse travel patterns is to provide separate services for different markets: 
express buses and trains for peak commuters; regular buses for local trips along busy corridors; 
paratransit for low-demand corridors and times. The problem with this approach is that the more 
public transport becomes tailor-made, the more it surrenders its environmental and economic 
advantages. A public transport system offering a direct service between every origin and 
destination would have low frequencies, low occupancies, high costs and high greenhouse 
emissions per passenger. 
The alternative is networks (Hensher 2009; Mees 2010; Nielsen and Lange 2005). This 
approach enables „anywhere-to-anywhere‟ travel while keeping occupancy rates high, by 
carrying different kinds of travellers on the same services. The key to planning a network is to 
knit together all available modes of public transport resources. Operational issues associated 
with a particular mode are seen as secondary to those of network structure. 
To begin the introduction of „networked‟ service planning, decisions must be made about the 
location of key suburban interchanges. These decisions largely follow from regional land-use 
plans and from the location of fixed-rail infrastructure, although it is necessary to take an 
iterative approach, which recognises that decisions about the location of high-quality public 
transport routes and interchanges will drive locational choices made by property developers. 
Once decisions are made about the basic structure for the network, the details of the operations 
of each component line must be considered in a way that allows stable and reliable 
performance, and which maximises connectivity at key points in the system. 
Transfers are integral to a public transport system that offers access to a large number of 
potential destinations at an affordable cost to the operator. Traditional public transport planning 
(in the English-speaking world, at least) has treated transfers as an inconvenience to be 
avoided (Balcombe et al. 2005; DfT 2006), but the network approach makes transfers the 
building blocks of a multidestinational system (Thompson and Matoff 2003, p. 298). 
3. Victorian Government plans recognise the need for 
intermodality and connectivity 
Since its election in 1999, the Victorian ALP government has put forward a long series of 
transport plans and policy documents in which intermodal connectivity figures strongly. Many of 
these documents set out clear targets and objectives and include specific organisational 
responsibilities and timelines. Key policies and action statements are listed in Table 1.  
In the 2002 plan, Melbourne 2030, the Department of Infrastructure (DoI) devised a Principal 
Public Transport Network (PPTN) as a key mechanism for achieving the government‟s target of 
increasing public transport modal share to 20 per cent by 2020 (DoI 2002). Then, Meeting Our 
Transport Challenges (MOTC) set a bold target of “synchronising of train, tram and bus 
timetables by the end of 2006” (DoI 2006, p. 59).  
The mechanisms for achieving these policy objectives are led by the government. The Director 
of Public Transport “manages all … contracts. [These] specify the levels of service that the 
operators are required to provide” (DoI 2005b, p. 5). There is a formal requirement in the 
franchise agreements for trains and trams for timetables to be reviewed every six months. 
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There is no regular review of bus timetables. A series of regional bus service reviews across the 
metropolitan area has been in progress for a number of years but any changes resulting from 
these reviews are implemented slowly and irregularly.   
Policy/Document Title 
Initiative/Priority/ 
Direction 
Objectives & Actions 
Growing Victoria Together  
(Victoria 2001, p. 16)  
2. Growing and linking all of 
Victoria 
Build faster, better, more accessible transport and 
communication links 
Melbourne 2030: Planning for 
sustainable growth 
(DoI 2002, p. 145) 
8. Better transport links 
8.2 Improve the operation of the existing …network with 
faster, more reliable and efficient on-road and rail public 
transport 
8.4 Coordinate development of all transport modes to 
provide a comprehensive transport system  
Linking Melbourne – 
Metropolitan Transport Plan  
(DoI 2004, pp.33-34) 
2.3 Improve service coordination 
and customer interface  
Priority actions: Integrating services under the Metlink 
banner: 
- Progressively improve timetable coordination 
across modes; for example, by encouraging train 
and tram operators to appoint full-time managers to 
oversee liaison between operators 
- Support and develop the role of Metlink as the 
integrated face of public transport in Melbourne…  
Agency responsible for delivery: DoI  
Linking Melbourne – 
Metropolitan Transport Plan – 
continued 
(DoI 2004, p.45) 
4.Increase public transport in 
middle and outer suburbs 
Smart Bus: 
- Better connections with train and tram services 
- Intelligent passenger information signs to provide 
real time information … at key stops, and 
information on bus, tram or train services at key 
interchanges  
Meeting Our Transport 
Challenges: connecting 
Victorian communities 
(DoI 2006, p.59) 
9. Create accessible, connected 
communities 
- Improving metropolitan interchanges: the 
synchronising of train, tram and bus timetables by 
the end of 2006 will also significant improve 
transfers between different modes of transport  
- Modal interchange program will commence in 2007 
Towards an Integrated and 
Sustainable Transport Future: A 
new legislative framework for 
transport in Victoria 
(DoI 2007, p.18) 
Transport system objectives 
An integrated and coordinated system. An effective  
transport system requires excellent integration and 
coordination between all agencies involved in 
transport policy and planning… Integration and 
coordination is also desirable between all land 
transport modes and among the different service 
providers. This ensures transport networks and 
services operate effectively and maximise the value 
of our investment in transport infrastructure. 
Victorian Transport Plan 
(DoT 2008c, p.61 & 68) 
3. Creating a Metro System 
Continued integration of bus timetables with train 
services  
- To make our trams, trains and buses more 
accessible and connected to one another… 
DoT Corporate Plan  
(DoT 2009, p. 34) 
 
Improve the accessibility and 
service quality of the transport 
system and address transport 
disadvantage 
Encourage improved usability and service quality 
through the new contractual arrangements for the 
operation of the metropolitan train and tram franchises 
including: 
- Better integration between modes 
Responsibility: DoT; Commercial Timeline: 2009  
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Table 1: Victorian Government policies and processes for intermodal connectivity 
In 2004, when the franchise agreements were re-negotiated and single operators for both trams 
and trains were put in place, the government established a framework for translating its long-
term strategic plans into projects that can be implemented through its „partnerships‟ with the 
franchisees. This framework is described in Figure 1 
 
Figure 1: Strategic Planning Framework. (DoI 2005a, p. 83)  
 
At this time, new arrangements were established to manage relationships between the 
government and the private operators through changes in the role of Metlink.  
Metlink began as a private company – set up during the first franchise period as a clearing-
house for the distribution of revenues collected through the multimodal ticketing system. 
However, during the reviews leading to 2004 re-franchising, the Victorian Auditor General 
identified a “lack of coordination between franchisees” (DoI 2005a, p. 19). DoT officials 
acknowledge that an intermodal approach was: 
effectively left out left out in the first round of franchises…there was no central body to 
facilitate the clashes between franchisees or public transport service operators over 
issues such intermodality (Alexander, research interview).  
In order to rectify this failure, the role of Metlink was upgraded. Its primary responsibility 
became securing: 
substantial and sustainable increases in public transport use and farebox revenue in 
Melbourne through improvements in key aspects of the network-wide product and 
marketing mix over which it has control (DoI 2005a, p.41). 
According to Alexander: 
Metlink is the coordinating body [that enables] discussions to take place between tram, 
train and bus on how they are going to deliver intermodal services. (research interview) 
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Metlink‟s central position in the intended lines of communication between the department and 
the operators is shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Metlink’s intended coordinating role (DoI 2005a, p.42)  
 
A further coordination mechanism between the department and the operators has been 
formalised in the 2009 franchise agreements, the Network Development Partnerships (NDP): 
will be the primary strategic forum for the State and the Franchisee to discuss and 
consider issues associated with the Franchise including strategic issues affecting 
infrastructure capacity, rolling stock capacity, operational performance, timetabling and 
passenger demand. (DoT 2008a, p. 49; 2008b, p. 49) 
4. Have these institutional arrangement delivered? 
Despite the clear government policies and targets for improved intermodal connectivity, the 
arrangements established through „strategic planning frameworks‟ and Metlink have failed to 
deliver. Service coordination is still poor. The Secretary of DoT, Jim Betts, admits that 
“generally speaking …  interchange is not as high as it might be” (Betts 2009). A study by the 
Public Transport Users Association (PTUA) in early 2010 found that just 37.5 percent of train 
arrivals have bus connections at stations and, of those, 42.5 percent require passengers to wait 
more than 10 minutes (PTUA 2010). 
DoT staff commonly make the argument that is impossible to deliver good connections at all 
transfer points when bus routes typically cross many rail lines (seven, in the case of the new 
orbital SmartBus route #903). However, this begs the question of the lack of rigour in the design 
of the basic network structure. And, even using the current route layout, poor timetable 
coordination is not confined to obscure corners of the system. A sample of points at which high 
demand for interchange should be expected (including the connection between train and bus at 
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Huntingdale station for travel from the inner city to Monash University) also shows poor 
timetable coordination (Lazanas 2009). 
 
4.1. What actually happens? 
The actual operation of each of the three key mechanism set up to deliver coordinated services 
is described below. 
4.1.1. Strategic planning framework 
To illustrate the strategic planning framework in action, Chris White (Connex General Manager, 
Network Development) described the introduction of the cross-city SmartBus route from Altona 
to Mordialloc (which commenced operations in April 2009). SmartBus is a key project in the 
implementation of the PPTN. 
SmartBus services are designed to operate at regular 15-minute headways and, in 2008, the 
Government asked Connex to match this during off-peak periods on the Werribee line by 
reducing the headway from 20 minutes to 15 minutes (White, research interview). However, 
Connex had already been planning independently to meet its own needs for greater capacity on 
the Werribee line by moving to a 10-minute headway. It argued that: 
the rail system does not cope with 15-minute frequencies particularly well due to the 
design of the extremities of the network, the single tracks do not allow for a 15-minute 
frequency (research interview).  
Although the SmartBus and the new Werribee rail services represent improvements to public 
transport, they were developed independently and opportunities for better connectivity were 
missed. 
4.1.2. Metlink  
Although, as described above, it may have been the DoT‟s intention for Metlink to be the central 
coordinating body for issues including improved intermodal connectivity, this is not reflected in 
Metlink‟s formal agreements with the government. 
Under Metlink‟s service agreement  with the DoT (Allens Arthur Robinson 2009), its key 
objectives are stated as follows: 
 Metlink's primary objective is to act as a comprehensive customer service provider, 
becoming a front-of-mind and coordinating resource for customers across all of the 
Victorian Public Transport Network. 
 
 Metlink will develop a superior understanding of customers and apply this knowledge 
to provide customers and potential customers with continuously improving products 
and services. Metlink will contribute to public transport fulfilling its potential as a key 
component in Victoria's overall transport system by aiming to increase awareness of 
public transport services in such a way that any increased usage of those services is 
sustainable (p.25). 
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Bernie Carolan (former Metlink CEO) pointed to this service agreement to demonstrate that 
Metlink was not responsible for managing the coordination of the timetables. He also 
emphasised the point that the organisation did not have the resources or professional 
capabilities to undertake this task (research interview).  
It is, therefore, not surprising that Metlink does not play a role in delivering a coordinated 
timetable across the various modes of transport. 
Dennis Cliche (then CEO of Yarra Trams) observed that:: 
Metlink doesn‟t do anything in that regard, nothing at all. Each operator does look at 
their own modes and we probably do lack a mechanism or a forum by which we could 
get altogether and run [public transport] to maximise intermodal connections (research 
interview). 
Cliche went on to explain that as part of his bid to retain the franchise for a third term: 
we got all the bus timetables, all the train timetables and the all tram timetables and we 
worked out how we could increase the opportunity for greater connectivity…we found 
significant opportunity to increase connectivity. What this showed is that in the current 
model there is something lacking to do that, whether or not you need a separate 
organisation or the auspices of a more powerful Metlink…or a more focused 
Government Department. 
At Connex, White described the timetabling process in these terms:  
we will make timetable changes every six months, and these are dictated by [Connex] 
projects and this is where it starts to get difficult because everyone thinks that they are 
the most important in the world. To get a timetable out every six months is a lot of hard 
work…The harsh reality in train timetabling, is the fact that there are many things that 
limit [what we can do], we certainly don‟t timetable to meet bus „x‟. Generally, we are 
dependent on [a bus operator] modifying its own behaviour…” (research interview). 
White went on to explain that once the timetables are internally signed off, they are then 
provisionally sent to the train section of the public transport division (PTD) in DoT for review and 
approval. When DoT signs off, the timetables are then submitted to Metlink for publication. At 
the same time, Connex also supply the relevant bus operators with a copy of the new timetable. 
However, bus operators have limited time and resources to amend their own timetables to 
reflect new train timetables, and there is no accountability to ensure that this takes place.  
Tram and bus timetabling happens in a similar manner, with each operator reporting to a 
different section of the PTD.  
Chris Loader (Transport Planning & Policy Manager, Bus Association of Victoria) discussed his 
personal views on the intermodality of public transport services in Melbourne. He believes that 
there are significant inefficiencies in the current system. He stated:  
we have lots of meetings with a range of stakeholders however there is a serious 
disconnect between transport planners in DoT and Metlink marketers. The operators do 
talk to Metlink but Metlink is responsible for printing timetable information that they are 
provided by the operators. Metlink have made an effort to understand operations but 
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they are another step removed from what is happening on the ground (research 
interview). 
Loader believes that a single centralised transport authority, similar to Translink in Vancouver, 
could deliver effective intermodal transport connections for Melbourne:  
if you had an agency that was doing the planning and also managing the tactical 
layer…you would have all the right people in one organisation… you wouldn‟t have to try 
and do [intermodal planning] across organisational boundaries.  
These comments confirm that no-one has responsibility for timetable coordination across the 
modes. It certainly does not occur through the mechanism shown in Figure 2. In fact, timetable 
changes are developed independently by each operator and approved by the relevant section 
of the PTD responsible for that mode of transport: timetabling of services is conducted in silos, 
both at the PTD level and at the operational level.  
A more accurate picture of the arrangements for timetable development is shown in Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3: Actual arrangements for timetable delivery – no active intermodal coordination 
ATRF 2010 Proceedings 
10 
 
4.1.3. Network Development Partnerships 
The new Network Development Partnerships (NDP), as established under the new franchises 
for both tram and train, codify a process that already exists between Connex and the DoT. It is 
now also part of the new tram franchise.  
The DoT sees the NDP as: 
a joint working group between the Government and operator to address common 
issues... it has been expanded to [look at] how are we going to develop the network in 
the short to medium term [and] how are we going to get together to deliver better 
services through rolling stock, infrastructure as well as service change (Alexander, 
research interview).  
As a participant in the NDP between Connex and the PTD, White confirmed that it operates on 
a single modal basis, he confirmed that in the new franchise term the NDP will enable 
metropolitan train issues to be discussed at the same time as regional train issues: 
there isn‟t really an equivalent forum … that gets tram and bus together. I think it would 
be worthwhile because DoT is not a very homogenous organisation, it is highly political, 
so even getting metropolitan rail, and V/Line together is a big step forward. 
Why have these institutional mechanisms failed? 
The principal reasons for the failure of current arrangements to deliver improved intermodal 
connectivity centre on the continued expectations of the intervention of market forces and as 
the evidence demonstrates, the absence of skilled transport planners, who have direct 
experience of the modern network planning practices described earlier. 
5.1. Still waiting for the market 
There is still an assumption that the financial incentives in place under the franchise 
agreements for train and tram and private contracts for bus operators should result in improved 
intermodal connections. Interestingly, this expectation is more strongly held by officials in the 
DoT than by the private operators themselves: 
because everybody is tied into the one revenue pool, the economic theory is that 
everyone is motivated to grow the pie, so the way you actually increase your revenue is 
not just about the services you produce, it is also about the services that other parties 
produce (Alexander, research interview). 
However, experience is against ideology on this question.  
The underlying problem of the government relying on economic market forces to increase 
services in the hope of making intermodal connections is that there is no incentive (financial or 
other) for the operators to invest the time and resources to undertake this activity at their own 
expense. It took Transdev ten years of operating the existing tram system before it began to 
explore the potential for better intermodal connectivity, as there was simply no incentive to do 
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this at its own cost. With the franchise now having gone to Keolis, it will be interesting to see if it 
will try to drive any positive changes to intermodal connections from the bottom up. 
5.2. More transport planning professionals where it counts 
As part of the research interviews, each individual was asked whether their relevant 
organisation employed transport planners with knowledge of the theory and practice of 
intermodal connectivity. 
At DoT transport planners are employed across the different sections of the Public Transport 
Division. However, there is little sign that, if they are providing internal advice based on 
international best-practice, this is being used to create good mechanisms for better timetable 
coordination or bus-route design. Nor do they seem to play a role in major operational 
decisions. Alexander noted that no transport planning professionals were on the panel that 
assessed the most recent round of franchise agreements awarded in November 2009 (research 
interview). The assessors, therefore, lacked the capacity to evaluate the significance of the 
efforts taken by Transdev to identify intermodal connections that could be made across the 
network. 
Interestingly, Cliche admitted that during his tenure at Yarra Trams he had not employed a 
transport planner but, had he retained the franchise, he was “looking to hire one” (research 
interview).  
At Connex, White questioned the benefits that intermodal transport planners would bring to the 
organisation as his company already employed numerous timetable analysts who understand 
the intricate operational safe systems within the rail network (research interview).   
Loader from the BAV, who demonstrated sound knowledge of intermodal planning theory and 
practice, acknowledged that there is a large disparity in the level of timetabling sophistication 
between different bus operators.  
Finally, Carolan confirmed that there were no transport planning professionals employed within 
Metlink (research interview). 
We are faced with a system where there is severe disconnect between written policy and 
practical application. Each organisation has their own idea of what intermodal connectivity 
means, but without skilled transport planning professionals with the power to guide and drive 
best practice, no organisation is actively concerned with delivering coordinated services. 
Currently, coordinating timetables across the modes is, at best, a reactive process by interested 
individuals, as opposed to a planned, strategic proactive process.  
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5. Conclusion 
The research has demonstrated that, although Government policies have been written and 
rewritten over many years using the same transport planning rhetoric of coordination, timetables 
across the different modes are not coordinated.  
It is clear from the interviews that, despite government policies, few of those in a position to act 
on these policies see intermodal coordination as a priority. Benefits of coordination are 
recognised in principle, but in day-to-day activity, problems within the operations of each mode 
take precedence. This is unsurprising given the existing structures in which public transport 
planning takes place and the professional experience of most managers. 
So, what structures or incentives might be put in place to ensure that coordination is given the 
priority that reflects both the content of government policy and the essential role of intermodality 
in the creation of effective public transport networks? 
The DoT still appears to rely on the existence of financial incentives: as Ross Alexander put it 
“everyone is motivated to grow the pie”. However, there is little indication that this incentive was 
motivating behaviour during the first decade of franchising. In the early years, the role of 
sfinancial incentive was obscured by a serious dispute between the operating companies over 
the distribution of revenues. This was partly resolved through the departure of National Express 
and the 2004 contract renegotiations that established train and tram operations under single 
franchises. However, as described in a separate paper at this conference, operators have over 
the past decade been able to increase their revenues by obtaining larger government subsidies 
rather than by increasing the revenue “pie” through better coordination (Stone 2010).  
It was only in the most recent bidding process that any operator showed interest in intermodal 
coordination. However, even if this was a sign that financial or regulatory aspects of the 
franchise contracts were beginning to drive change, it was not seen by decision-makers in 
government or the DoT as a significant enough offering to enable the Transdev consortium to 
win its bid for contract renewal. This must be seen as a further sign of the lack of priority given 
to intermodal coordination and the weakness of financial incentive as a motivator for change. 
However, even if the government did strongly re-assert its policy commitments and make 
coordination a high priority for senior officials in the Department of Transport, is it likely that the 
current convoluted and highly bureaucratic environments could deliver significant outcomes?.    
Under current institutional arrangements, there continues to be a gap of communication 
between and within the many organisations responsible for timetabling activities. No single 
organisation is responsible for this task. There appears to be a growing recognition, among the 
private-sector operators, if not in the government or the DoT, that new mechanisms must be 
created if Melbourne is to ever experience the benefits of a comprehensive and connected 
public transport network.  
What mechanisms are appropriate for Melbourne? Lessons can learned from the mechanisms 
for coordination that that are used in cities that have made significant steps towards the 
development of „networked‟ public transport: cities in which, in large part, patronage growth is 
driven by good intermodal coordination.  
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In cities with good intermodal coordination, planning for public transport networks is done 
through a single public agency with the power to plan and share resources across the urban 
region. This approach has achieved positive results in London and Copenhagen and in Swiss, 
German and Swedish cities and towns (Mees 2010). It is also being introduced to improve 
integration of buses and trains in Singapore (Land Transport Authority of Singapore 2008, pp. 
38-39). In Australia, these institutional arrangements are in place in Perth, where public 
transport patronage has grown steadily since the early 1990s (Stone 2009), and in Brisbane, 
Translink was established for this purpose in 2008. This direction is also gaining ground in 
Australian national policymaking through the findings of an all-party Senate committee (Senate 
Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Committee 2009) and support from Infrastructure 
Australia (IA 2009). 
So, Melbourne would be aligning itself with national and international trends if it were to move to 
establish a public authority to plan coordinated multimodal public transport network. To do this, 
government would need to abandon the current bipartisan support for the franchise model. 
However, this could be done without financial penalty and, given the degree of dissatisfaction 
with current public transport operations, would arguably be popular with voters. 
To succeed in Melbourne, such an agency would need to be given clear guidance from 
government that intermodal coordination was a key priority and it would need to employ skilled 
professionals who would guide strategy and policymaking as well as oversee implementation 
with achievable targets and commensurate incentives. . It remains to be seen whether the 
Victorian Government will rise to the challenge.  
 
References 
Allens Arthur Robinson 2009, Metlink Services Agreement, unpublished, Melbourne. 
Balcombe, R, Mackett, R, Paulley, R, Preston, J, Shires, J, Titteridge, H, Wardman, M & White, 
P 2005, The Demand for Public Transport: A practical guide, Report TRL593, TRL 
Limited, Crowthorne, UK. 
Betts, J 2009, Evidence to the Victorian Legislative Council Select Committee on Train 
Services, http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/council/trainservices/, viewed 20 May 2010  
DfT 2006, Putting Passengers First: The Government's proposals for a modernised national 
framework for bus services, Department for Transport, London. 
DoI 2002, Melbourne 2030: Planning for Sustainable Growth, State of Victoria, Melbourne. 
--- 2004, Linking Melbourne: Metropolitan Transport Plan, Department of Infrastructure, 
Melbourne. 
--- 2005a, Public Transport Partnerships: An overview of passenger rail franchising in Victoria, 
Public Transport Division, Melbourne. 
--- 2005b, Track Record: Victoria’s, Train, Tram and Bus Services, Quarterly Performance 
Bulletin: January-March 2005, Department of Infrastructure, Melbourne. 
--- 2006, Meeting our Transport Challenges, State of Victoria, Melbourne. 
--- 2007, Towards an Integrated and Sustainable Transport Future: A new legislative framework 
for transport in Victoria, Department of Infrastructure, Melbourne. 
DoT 2008a, Invitation to Tender (ITT) Melbourne Metropolitan Train Franchise, Vol 1&2, 
Department of Transport, Melbourne. 
ATRF 2010 Proceedings 
14 
--- 2008b, Invitation to Tender (ITT) Melbourne Metropolitan Tram Franchise, Vol 1&2, 
Department of Transport, Melbourne. 
--- 2008c, Victorian Transport Plan, Victorian Department of Transport, Melbourne. 
--- 2009, Corporate Plan, Department of Transport, Melbourne. 
Hensher, D 2009, Frequency and connectivity: key drivers of reform in urban public transport 
provision. Submission to Senate Inquiry into the investment of Commonwealth and State 
funds in public passenger transport, viewed 10 June 2009 
www.aph.gov.au/Senate/Committee/rrat_ctte/public_transport/submissions/sub07.pdf. 
IA 2009, National Infrastructure Priorities: Infrastructure for an economically, socially, and 
environmentally sustainable future, Infrastructure Australia, Canberra. 
Land Transport Authority of Singapore 2008, Land Transport Master Plan: A People-Centred 
Land Transport System Singapore. 
Lazanas, K 2009, An investigation of the current institutional arrangements for the design and 
delivery of intermodal public transport services in Melbourne, MUP  thesis, University of 
Melbourne, Melbourne. 
Mees, P 2010, Transport for Suburbia: Beyond the Automobile Age, Earthscan, London. 
Nielsen, G & Lange, T 2005, HiTrans Best Practice Guide No. 2, Public Transport: Planning the 
Networks, European Union, Interreg IIIB Stavanger, Norway. 
PTUA 2010, Poor connections leave passengers waiting, viewed 20 May 2010 
http://www.ptua.org.au/2010/05/09/train-bus-connections/#more-1354. 
Roth, G & Wynne, G 1982, Free enterprise urban transportation, Transaction, New Brunswick, 
USA. 
Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Committee 2009, Report of the Senate 
Committee Inquiry into Investment of Commonwealth and State funds in public 
passenger transport infrastructure and services, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra. 
Stone, J 2009, 'Contrasts in reform: how the Cain and Burke years shaped public transport in 
Melbourne and Perth ', Urban Policy and Research, vol. 27, no. 4, pp. 419-434.  
--- 2010, 'Turning over a new franchise: assessing the current health of public transport 
management in Melbourne' 33rd Australian Transport Research Forum, Canberra, 
ATRF  
Thompson, G & Matoff, T 2003, 'Keeping Up with the Joneses: Radial vs. Multidestinational 
Transit in Decentralizing Regions', Journal of the American Planning Association, vol. 
69, no. 3.  
Victoria 2001, Growing Victoria Together: Innovative State, Caring Communities State 
Government of Victoria, Melbourne. 
 
 
An investigation of institutional arrangements for multimodal public transport in Melbourne 
15 
Appendix 
Name Title Organisation 
Interview 
Date 
Chris Loader 
Transport Planning & 
Policy Manager 
Bus Association 
Victoria 
6  March 2009 
Ross Alexander 
Deputy Director Public 
Transport 
Department of 
Transport 
9  April 2009 
Chris White 
General Manager, 
Network Development 
Connex  12  June 2009 
John Stanley2 
Adjunct Professor, Bus 
Industry Confederation, 
Senior Fellow in 
Sustainable Land 
Transport 
Institute of 
Transport and 
Logistics Studies 
(ITLS)  
23 July 2009 
Dennis Cliche Chief Executive Officer Yarra Trams 27 July 2009 
Bernie Carolan  Chief Executive Officer Metlink  31 July 2009 
 
Table 2: Practitioners interviewed for this research (notes and recordings in 
possession of the author) 
                                            
2
 John Stanley was a former Executive Director of the Bus Association of Victoria 
